Congressional Inaction is Enabling Executive Overreach
Why Speaker Mike Johnson’s Failure to Check Presidential Power is a Constitutional Crisis—And How the People Can Step In
The U.S. Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances in which Congress must robustly check executive power. In practice, however, Congress has increasingly failed to fulfill this duty, enabling an expansion of “imperial” presidential power. This article examines the constitutional requirements for legislative oversight of the executive branch, how Speaker Mike Johnson’s leadership exemplifies Congress’s abdication of these responsibilities, and historical instances where congressional inaction backfired or spurred a backlash. It then discusses the consequences of an unchecked executive. We explore what public pressure and legal avenues can compel the restoration of checks and balances in our democracy.
Constitutional Framework for Checks and Balances
The Constitution does not explicitly use the term “oversight” but carefully divides powers to ensure each branch can limit the others. As James Madison famously wrote in Federalist No. 51, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition,” meaning each branch must have the motive and means to resist encroachments by the others. Congress was given extensive powers to rein in the executive: it alone enacts laws, controls the national purse, approves high-level appointments and treaties in the Senate, can declare war, and holds the impeachment power (Art. I §§ 2–3; Art. I § 8; Art. II § 2). These tools are not optional – they are the mechanisms by which the legislative branch ensures no President can operate above the law.
Through the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress also has implied authority to conduct investigations and oversight of the executive. The Supreme Court has affirmed that Congress’s power of inquiry “stands on equal footing with its authority to legislate and appropriate.” The power to investigate has been called “perhaps the most necessary of all the powers” underlying legislation because Congress cannot make or enforce laws effectively without information. This principle, recognized since McGrain v. Daugherty (1927), deems congressional investigations “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” Likewise, the Constitution’s framers provided the ultimate check of impeachment and removal for high officials, including the President, if they commit “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” (Art. II § 4). Together, these constitutional powers create a duty for Congress to supervise and, when necessary, constrain executive actions.
The design assumes Congress will guard its prerogatives. Madison warned that concentrating all powers in the same hands is “the very definition of tyranny.” Congress is expected to oversee executive conduct and actively push back on overreach. Modern commentators note that Congress’ failure to perform this role has led to accusations of an “imperial presidency” – a chief executive governing with little restraint. The constitutional structure is premised on Congress exercising its authorities, not abdicating them. When Congress shirks its oversight responsibilities, it isn’t just neglecting a task – it is breaking the constitutional bargain of checks and balances that protects liberty.
Speaker Mike Johnson’s Inaction and Congressional Failures
Speaker Mike Johnson’s tenure epitomizes modern Congress’s reluctance to check the executive branch, especially when the President is of the same party. Scholars observe that today’s lawmakers often “reflexively support their own party. In periods of unified government, this means extreme deference to the President… Neither scenario yields effective oversight.” In Johnson’s case, as a Republican Speaker aligned with a Republican president, this deference has translated into inaction and even overt defense of executive overreach. Congress’s institutional loyalty has been subsumed by partisan loyalty, undermining the intended tension between the branches.
Despite claiming to champion Congress’s Article I powers, Speaker Johnson has primarily shielded the executive branch from scrutiny. For example, when President Trump recently issued a flurry of executive orders and even instructed agencies to freeze spending or shut down, which Congress had approved, Johnson did not challenge these actions. Johnson insists he is “a fierce advocate and defender of Article I” and that the founders made the legislature primary for a reason. Yet, he downplays Trump’s abuse of executive power in the same breath. Johnson characterized the President’s unilateral directives as mere “stewardship” and internal efficiency measures, dismissing concerns that Congress’s authority was being usurped. In one instance, he defended Trump’s call to withhold funds from programs that didn’t align with White House mandates, arguing that the executive “has the right to evaluate how… taxpayer dollars [are] being handled.” This stance effectively excuses the President for bypassing Congress’s power of the purse.
Speaker Johnson has not only failed to initiate meaningful oversight of controversial executive initiatives – he has actively supported efforts to neutralize other checks. Notably, he agreed “wholeheartedly” with remarks by Trump administration officials (including Vice President J.D. Vance) that federal judges were overstepping by blocking specific executive actions. After a court halted an administration program spearheaded by Elon Musk (appointed as an “efficiency czar”), Johnson publicly questioned the judiciary’s authority to interfere with “the executive’s legitimate power.” Such statements signal a disturbing abdication: rather than defending Congress’s constitutional role, the Speaker echoed the executive’s gripe against judicial oversight. By siding with the President’s view that court orders can be brushed aside as mere obstacles to be “appealed” and overcome, Johnson effectively gave the executive branch license to push the boundaries of law without fear of legislative pushback.
Johnson’s inaction is part of a broader, bipartisan failure of recent congressional leadership to check the executive. Leaders in Congress often resist holding presidents of their party accountable, and even opposition-party leaders can be timid. For example, under the prior administration, Democratic leaders did not seriously investigate or critique President Biden’s contentious actions – such as the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan or the expansive use of executive orders on student loan forgiveness and other policies. As one commentator noted, “Democrats remained silent in the face of mounting evidence that their President was physically and mentally not up to the job… This is not just a Republican problem. It is a congressional problem.” In short, Congress’s upper echelons in both parties have too often placed political unity or fear of electoral retribution above their institutional duty to oversee the executive. Speaker Johnson’s tenure so far exemplifies this trend: public statements aside, he has not marshaled the House to restrain executive excesses, whether through rigorous hearings, subpoenas, or legislative fixes. Instead, congressional oversight hearings have devolved into “political kabuki” – theatrics aimed at scoring points against the other party rather than genuine scrutiny of executive operations. The result is a Congress that, in the words of one analyst, “cannot and will not do its job,” creating a vacuum of accountability at the top of government.
Historical Examples of Inaction and Backlash
History provides stark lessons about the cost of Congress failing to check presidents – and how belated action or public backlash eventually occurs when the imbalance goes too far:
Vietnam War & War Powers (1960s–1970s): Throughout the 1960s, Congress largely acquiesced as Presidents Johnson and Nixon escalated the Vietnam War without formal declarations or adequate legislative oversight. This inaction contributed to a protracted, unpopular conflict. The political and public blowback eventually forced Congress to reassert itself. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto, aiming to ensure “the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply” to any future introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities. The War Powers Act requires the President to consult Congress and limits unilateral military deployments to 60–90 days without congressional approval. While its effectiveness has been debated (many presidents have skirted it), the Act directly responded to legislative inaction during Vietnam. It demonstrated that when Congress fails to check war-making, it can lead to quagmires that spark public protests and force lawmakers into reactive measures to reclaim authority.
Nixon’s Impoundments & Budget Act (1974): Another 1970s clash involved President Nixon impounding funds that Congress had appropriated for programs he opposed, effectively ignoring the legislature's will. Initially, a timid Congress struggled to respond, but as Nixon’s impoundments proliferated, lawmakers and the public grew alarmed at this breach of the separation of powers. The backlash led to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which “reasserted Congress’ power of the purse” by outlawing unilateral executive impoundment of funds. Title X of that Act establishes procedures to prevent any President from “unilaterally substituting their own funding decisions for those of the Congress,” closing the door Nixon tried to open. In addition, the Supreme Court made clear in Train v. City of New York (1975) that even absent the 1974 Act, the President cannot simply ignore congressional spending directives. This episode shows that Congress’s initial inaction (or slow reaction) in the face of executive overreach can prompt a later legislative revolt to restore constitutional balance – but often only after significant conflict and public outcry.
Intelligence Abuses & the Church Committee (1975): Congress did little to oversee the executive’s national security and intelligence activities for much of the early Cold War. This lack of scrutiny allowed serious abuses to fester in agencies like the FBI and CIA (illegal surveillance, COINTELPRO, assassination plots, etc.). The truth eventually came out through whistleblowers and journalists, causing public outrage. In response – and after years of inaction – the Senate convened the Church Committee in 1975 to investigate these abuses, and the House had a parallel Pike Committee. The findings led Congress to establish permanent intelligence oversight committees and pass reforms such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. These reforms were essentially Congress catching up on oversight duties it had neglected; they were driven by public and legal pressure once the extent of executive misconduct could no longer be ignored. This illustrates that when Congress fails to proactively check secretive executive operations, the consequences (erosion of civil liberties, illegal activities) eventually provoke a corrective response, albeit after the damage has been done.
Post-9/11 Powers & Surveillance: In the aftermath of the September 11th attack, Congress rushed to grant the Bush-Cheney Administration broad new powers with little initial resistance—most notably by passing the USA PATRIOT Act with overwhelming votes and minimal debate. The Act dramatically expanded surveillance and law-enforcement authority at the cost of civil liberties, essentially writing the executive branch a “blank check” in the name of security. The ramifications became clear only years later, especially after the Snowden revelations in 2013, which showed the NSA’s mass surveillance programs.
The public backlash was swift, and legal challenges mounted. In response to the outcry, Congress belatedly took action to rein in surveillance – bypassing the USA FREEDOM Act in 2015 to end bulk phone data collection. This cycle – initial congressional passivity, public and legal pushback, and partial congressional course correction – underscores the risks of rubber-stamping executive requests during crises. As former Senator Russ Feingold noted, in the two decades since 9/11, “Congress has ceded much of its power to the executive… often becoming more spectator than participant” in national security policy. The eventual reforms show that public pressure and lawsuits (ACLU and others challenged surveillance programs in court) can force Congress to reckon with its abdication of oversight.
Trump’s First Term (2017–2021): During President Trump’s first term, many in Congress—especially within his party—declined to challenge contentious executive actions, from travel bans to emergency declarations. This inaction often shifted the burden to other institutions. For instance, when Trump declared a national emergency in 2019 to redirect funds toward building a border wall (after Congress refused to appropriate those funds), Congress initially voted on a bipartisan basis to terminate the emergency as an overreach. Both the Republican-led Senate and Democratic House passed resolutions to cancel the emergency and to block unauthorized arms sales and military engagements (such as U.S. support for the war in Yemen). However, President Trump vetoed these measures, and Congress failed to muster the two-thirds votes to override. The legal battle then shifted to the courts and to state attorneys general – a coalition of states sued, arguing the President violated the Appropriations Clause. Although the Supreme Court ultimately mooted the case (after the change in administration), the episode showcased how congressional hesitation to firmly check the executive (i.e., not overriding the veto) led to protracted legal battles and public criticism.
Similarly, when Congress took no action regarding President Trump’s potential violations of the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause (which forbids a president from accepting foreign gifts or payments without congressional consent), state attorneys general stepped into the breach. In 2017, the Attorneys General of Maryland and D.C. sued the President to enforce the Emoluments Clause, and nearly 200 members of Congress later filed a parallel lawsuit, arguing that Trump’s refusal to seek Congress’s approval for foreign business profits was denying them the opportunity to perform their constitutional role. These unprecedented lawsuits directly resulted from Congress’s refusal, under then-Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Leader Mitch McConnell, to confront the issue. While the suits did not ultimately result in judicial relief (they were dismissed as moot after Trump left office), they demonstrated that prolonged legislative inaction would spur other actors to seek remedies through the courts – and that a segment of the public and state officials were willing to push back, even if Congress would not.
Each of these examples highlights a pattern: when Congress fails to act as a check, problems fester and often worsen. Eventually, the imbalance triggers a correction – new laws, judicial intervention, electoral backlash, or public protest – but significant damage to policy, trust in government, or constitutional norms may have occurred by then. In other words, congressional inaction will be answered, one way or another. The key question is whether Congress will fulfill its constitutional duty in time to prevent crises rather than reacting only after the fact.
Consequences of an Unchecked Executive
A legislature that consistently yields to an aggressive executive fundamentally alters the balance of our constitutional system. Without meaningful oversight, the accumulation of power in the executive branch creates precisely the scenario the framers feared. When Presidents realize Congress will not hold them accountable, the result is an “imperial presidency” where the chief executive rules more by decree than by the people’s elected assembly. Such imbalance threatens the very definition of a republic. The checks and balances in the Constitution are not mere formalities; as one former senator observed, “Our democracy depends on checks and balances being more than just symbolic.” If Congress becomes a weak spectator, then-presidential actions that defy laws or norms can go unchecked, and the rule of law suffers. Over time, this can lead to a normalization of autocratic behavior – each President pushing further, citing the acquiescence given to predecessors.
An unchecked executive is likelier to test legal limits, provoking constitutional crises. We have already seen instances of presidents firing inspectors general or refusing to comply with subpoenas, and without congressional pushback, these acts become precedent for future administrations. The absence of oversight invites executive officials to act with impunity, increasing the risk of corruption and law-breaking. It can also skew the separation of powers in the courts. If Congress doesn’t defend its interests, courts are hesitant to intervene in what appears to be a political dispute, further emboldening the executive. Ultimately, suppose one branch ceases to perform its checking function. In that case, the delicate interbranch equilibrium the Constitution created will collapse – leaving essentially one-and-a-half functioning branches (the executive and a judiciary that may or may not constrain it) and a neutered legislature. This concentration of power can slide into authoritarianism before the public realizes what has been lost.
Another consequence is the erosion of public trust in government. When citizens see Congress failing to address executive missteps or abuses – an unjustified military action, a bungled disaster response, or ethical transgressions – they lose confidence that anyone in power is looking out for the public interest. The legislature is meant to be the people’s direct voice in the federal government; if that voice is silent or ignored, people understandably grow cynical. They may either disengage from politics (feeling their representatives have no real influence) or gravitate toward extremist “strongman” leaders who promise to act unilaterally to “get things done,” further feeding the cycle of unchecked executive power. In describing the current dysfunction, Steven Pearlstein noted that decades of congressional failure have “invited – or forced – judges and presidents to act to fill that vacuum, which over time has reduced the power and importance of the legislative branch.” The public now expects an imperial president and a do-nothing Congress, a dangerous shift in norms. Without correction, this undermines the very notion of government by the people, as the branch most responsive to elections (Congress) ceases to channel the people’s will or check executive ambitions effectively.
A weakened Congress also means less deliberation and consensus in policymaking. The executive branch may bypass Congress through executive orders and administrative actions that swing widely with each administration. Such policies lack the durability of law passed by Congress and can be reversed by the next executive, creating whiplash and instability in governance. Significant national problems may go unaddressed by legislation (because the executive prefers unilateral action and Congress doesn’t assert itself to legislate), leading to either overreach by agencies or complete paralysis. In sum, the long-term implications of a feeble legislative branch are a less accountable government, policies that reflect the whims of whoever holds the presidency, and a citizenry alienated from their republican institutions.
What Can Be Done Now: Restoring Checks and Balances
Reversing the trend of congressional abdication will require action from other parts of the system and the public. Legal and civic pathways exist to compel or encourage Congress to fulfill its constitutional duties.
State Attorneys General have emerged as critical enforcers of checks and balances when Congress fails to act. In recent years, coalitions of state attorneys general have sued the federal executive over various alleged legal violations – from travel bans and environmental rollbacks to immigration policies – effectively doing what Congress would not. Legal scholars note that “state attorneys general are now the most important actors in checking the executive branch’s exercise of delegated authority,” filling the gap left by a gridlocked or pliant Congress. States often have standing to sue because federal actions can harm their residents or finances, allowing them to challenge executive overreach in court. These lawsuits can produce injunctions that halt unlawful executive initiatives, temporarily compelling the executive to respect legal limits. Citizens can push their state AGs to take action by lobbying them to join multi-state suits on issues where Congress is mute. For example, residents can urge their AG to file or join an appropriate lawsuit if the executive branch refuses to enforce a law or exceeds its statutory authority. While litigation is not a substitute for legislation, it can check an out-of-control executive and create pressure for Congress to step in. (Notably, even the Emoluments Clause lawsuits discussed above were led by state AGs when Congress would not act, highlighting the role of states in upholding constitutional accountability.)
Apart from state-led actions, other legal avenues exist to constrain an unchecked executive and indirectly prod Congress. Private citizens, organizations, and even members of Congress have turned to the courts when the legislative branch fails to respond to an urgent constitutional issue. Although courts are sometimes reluctant to intervene (citing “political questions” or standing doctrines), there have been cases where the judiciary acknowledges Congress’s injury. For instance, a federal court found that members of Congress did have standing to sue the President over foreign emoluments, essentially recognizing a harm in Congress being denied its oversight role. Similarly, when agencies defy congressional intent, affected parties (such as businesses or advocacy groups) can sue under the Administrative Procedure Act, and courts can invalidate executive actions as “arbitrary and capricious” or beyond the President’s statutory authority. Each time a court strikes down an overreaching executive order or rule, it sends a message that Congress’s laws and the Constitution cannot be ignored. These legal decisions can embolden legislators to assert themselves or set boundaries that the executive must heed. Citizens and watchdog groups should continue to use tools like FOIA requests and lawsuits to expose executive misconduct. Often, these efforts bring problems to light that shame Congress into holding hearings or taking action. In short, a vigilant civil society and an engaged judiciary can compensate, to a degree, for congressional inaction by upholding the rule of law and forcing issues onto the agenda.
The most potent corrective is democratic pressure. Voters and constituents must demand that their representatives reclaim Congress’s role as a co-equal branch. This means contacting your House members and Senators about oversight issues – for example, urging them to support subpoenas or investigations into executive branch failures, regardless of party. It also means using the ballot box to hold lawmakers accountable. Suppose a Member of Congress consistently places party or loyalty to the President above the constitutional duty to check the executive. In that case, constituents can make their displeasure known in town halls and, if necessary, vote for someone who will put country over party. Citizens can also support nonpartisan reform efforts (such as proposals to strengthen Congress’s capacity to perform oversight or bipartisan caucuses focused on reining in executive power). Public opinion still matters – history has shown that when enough citizens raise an outcry (as in the Vietnam protests or the post-Watergate demand for reform), Congress eventually responds. As Pearlstein observed, the ongoing constitutional crisis of an unleashed executive “is on [Congress] – and on us for not holding them to account.” An engaged electorate that prizes checks and balances can pressure Congress to remember its constitutional oath.
While external pressure is critical, members of Congress themselves can take steps to strengthen oversight. For instance, congressional committees can enforce subpoenas through inherent contempt or seek court enforcement more aggressively when faced with stonewalling. Rank-and-file members can insist on regular oversight hearings and use informal tools to spotlight executive abuses (even a lone member can trigger significant investigations by shining a light, as history shows ). Congress could also revisit its rules and procedures that have made it challenging to act – for example, reforming the filibuster or fast-tracking specific oversight resolutions – so that a determined majority can respond to urgent executive transgressions. These are mainly political solutions, but legal pathways (like changing laws to claw back delegated emergency powers or sunset overly broad authorizations) are available if the will exists. Citizens should encourage their representatives to support such institutional reforms. After all, each member of Congress has sworn to uphold the Constitution – they must be reminded that this includes defending the legislature’s prerogatives.
However it is achieved, rebalancing the separation of powers is essential for a healthy democracy. The framers designed our government on the insight that unchecked power will be abused; only oversight, constraint, and the “personal motives” of ambitious officeholders counteracting one another can preserve liberty. When one branch falls on the job, it falls to others – state governments, courts, and the people – to step in. While not originally the primary plan for oversight, state attorneys general suing the federal government have become a modern bulwark against executive lawlessness. Judges, too, may act as referees when called upon. But in the long run, nothing can truly substitute for a Congress willing to govern and check and balance the executive as the Constitution intended. Citizens have both the right and the responsibility to insist on this standard. By pushing their state AGs and representatives to act and stay informed and vocal, ordinary people can help realign our government with its first principles. The stakes are high: without genuine checks and balances, the freedoms and democratic accountability we take for granted could evaporate. Reasserting congressional oversight is not a partisan issue but a fundamental safeguard for the republic. It ensures that “ambition” in the executive is met with equal ambition in the legislature, fulfilling the vision of a self-correcting democracy where power cannot run unchecked. The sooner Congress rediscovers this vision – voluntarily or due to legal compulsion – the safer our constitutional system will be.
Congress’s ongoing failure to be a check on executive power represents a dereliction of its constitutional duty and a threat to the balance of our government. Speaker Mike Johnson’s inaction exemplifies how partisan calculations have eclipsed fidelity to the separation of powers. Yet history teaches that such imbalances eventually provoke a response – whether through new laws, court battles, or public revolt. It would be far better for Congress to course-correct now than to wait for crises to force its hand. In the meantime, state attorneys general, the courts, and an engaged citizenry are crucial in holding the line. By invoking legal mechanisms and raising their voices, they can prod our legislators back toward doing what the Constitution requires: checking and balancing a powerful executive and securing the liberties of the American people.